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Abstract 
The authors sum up the more capital questions of the asymmetric warfare and its 
psychological factors. They give overview about the military-scientific basis 
of the asymmetric warfare and its threats; interpretation of asymmetry in the activities 
of national security; Systematic elements of strategic asymmetry; coherence of strategy 
reacting to asymmetric threats with other strategies and finally psychological aspects 
of asymmetric warfare. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In our article we want to discuss one of the most frequently mentioned topics of today’s 
military science and national security, the so-called ”asymmetric warfare and 
intimidation” and its psychological aspects. Our aim is not the explanation 
of the military scientific aspect of the term, but the sociological and psychological 
aspect of this phenomenon. But to do this, it is essential to analyse the essence 
of warfare in a couple of words. 
The second part of the research deals with the socio-psychological mass aspect of this 
term, its influence on today’s national security 
 
1. THE MILITARY- SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF THE ASYMMETRIC 
WARFARE AND ITS THREATS 
 
National security (military) specialists have been using this term as some kind 
of a paradigm, however, in our domestic literature, it is not possible to find any basic 
analysis of the main questions of the asymmetric warfare, that would give its main 
definition, and based on that would give the answers within the area of   national 
security. If we analyse these scientific papers, we can see that this warfare strategy is 
considered an axiom, and quite often terrorism and asymmetric warfare are looked upon 
as one and the same.  
We base our findings on relevant research in the USA, on results of operational 
experience, on the information from our domestic literature, as well as on our analysis 
of this topic. 
 
As a starting point we can consider a simple fact that in wars, in conflicts 
when weapons are used there are always present differences (asymmetries) between 
the participants, in the terms of quality, quantity and morale. It is a historical fact that 
in certain times, from the point of view of the final result in wars, these differences, 
called asymmetries, did not play a significant role, though it was different in other 
conflicts. This simplifying viewpoint does not take into consideration or shadows 
the fact that certain warring parties build their strategy on these very asymmetries. 
 
According to the Chinese Sun Tzu, every warfare is based on deception and he suggests 
to avoid the enemy which bears concentrated force, and to attack the enemy only by 
means of military deception. As a matter of fact, Sun Tzu built an existing strategy on 
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asymmetry, which is eerily similar to the situation that the USA and its allies have to 
face today.   
  
The common interpretation of the term requires a complex definition, since only this 
common platform can provide for future discussion. Almost all relevant experts 
establish that asymmetric warfare is not a new category, since even in the bible David 
and Goliath exemplify the difference in the strategy of warriors who possess 
asymmetric capabilities. However, a common definition and the answers to asymmetric 
threats have appeared only recently, the reason is that the actual military scientific 
and national security research started after 9/11 2001 when the fight against terrorism 
in the USA and its European allies became the central point of the national security. 
 
2. INTERPRETATION OF ASSYMETRY IN THE ACTIVITIES 
OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
 
In 1998 the National defence University of Washington defined asymmetric warfare as 
an „unfair” form of warfare.1
In 1999 the definition presented in the Joint Strategy Review tried to establish a wider 
definition which would be more acceptable for the military, as well as for the „decision-
makers”, the introduction of the   so- called asymmetric approach (viewpoint). 
According to this term, „the strategy of the enemy is aimed at eluding, deceiving or 
undermining the weaknesses of the USA with methods that significantly differ 
from the operational ones expected by the USA… usually they focus on psychological 
elements, like shock effect or disturbance, which influence the American ability to 
initiate, morale, as well as freedom of action. The asymmetric approach is based 
on thorough evaluation of the vulnerability of the enemy. It often applies innovative, not 
traditional procedures, weapons or technologies. Asymmetric warfare can appear 
in the entire spectrum of military activities, it can be operational, tactical, 
and strategic.”
 This definition was based on highly subjective evaluation 
and quite often it did not represent an easily managed category. 
2
 
 
This definition has tight strings with national security in America, with the challenges 
and strategic environment, in other words, it is not general or common enough in its 
character. Moreover, it contains only the „negative asymmetry”, which is based 
on the opinion that the USA is already in great advantage in its technological, military, 
economic capabilities compared to anybody else, so it does not deal with situations 
where equal or almost equal partners apply asymmetric procedures against each other, 
in other words, they base their entire strategy on asymmetry. 
 
Steven Metz and Douglas V Johnson II tried to establish a more general, more complex 
definition, which can improve the above- mentioned insufficiencies.3
“Asymmetry when applied to national security and the military, practically represents 
different  varieties of action,  organisations, way of thinking from those of the opponent, 
 
                                                 
1 Strategic Assessment 1998: Engaging Power for Peace (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National 
Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1998) 
2 Joint Strategy Review 1999, Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 
1999, p. 2. 
3 Steven Metz és Douglas V. Johnson II. Asymmetry and U.S. military strategy: definition, background, 
and strategic concepts; (5., 6. oldal), 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=223, (2008. 04. 06.) 
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which is aimed at maximising their own strength and to use the weaknesses 
of the enemy, as well as to be able to initiate or to gain  more significant freedom 
of action.  So, asymmetry can be politically-strategic or military- strategic or 
the combination of both.” 
 
According to the above-mentioned authors, in practice it means different methods, 
technologies, organisational framework, it can also be described by several other 
characteristics, such as  the dimensions, levels and forms of asymmetry. 
 
3. SYSTEMATIC ELEMENTS OF STRATEGIC ASSYMETRY 
 
3.1. DIMENSIONS OF ASYMMETRY 
 
Strategic asymmetry may be positive or negative in its character. It is usually 
determined by the opinions or the relative positions of the opposing parties 
When speaking about positive asymmetry, the United States, for example, emphasises 
the importance of high level of training, efficient leadership,, and the top  technology 
of the leadership infrastructure, as well as the military arsenal which supports them. 
This strategy is built on the exploitation of this relevant superiority; on the other hand, 
negative asymmetry is based not on its own strength, but on the desire to use the 
weaknesses of the enemy. Consequently, based on these terms, the coalitions led by the 
USA have to prepare for combat against threats represented by negative asymmetry. 
 
Asymmetry possesses some kind of time aspect; it can have a short- time aspect, as well 
as a long-time one. There are several examples for both in military science. 
There are fewer examples for long-term asymmetry in our days, though certain 
superpowers, in certain periods of time, held onto their success based on positive 
asymmetry, but in long term, the balance moved towards equality. 
 
Strategic asymmetry can be brought about intentionally, or there can be asymmetry that 
appears because of the relative position of the opposing parties. Success is not always 
guaranteed by the superiority in the basic situation, because the analysis of situations 
shows that the reacting strategies must be flexible and adaptable if a warring opponent 
whose strategy is based on negative asymmetry needs to be defeated. 
 
The factor of the risk level of asymmetric threat can be low or very high. Forces 
of excellent training who are operationally well-prepared, the possibility of success or 
failure represent the high risk category of asymmetry. Having forces that require serious 
material investment, not to mention their deployment against asymmetric threats 
is of high risk, to mention, for example, the terrorist attack in Aden of the USS COLE, 
where terrorists achieved great success without much expenditure. On the other hand, 
terrorism is characterised by small expenditure, expected success and low risk factors. 
 
3.2. COHERENCE OF STRATEGY REACTING TO 
ASYMMETRIC THREATS WITH OTHER STRATEGIES 
 
Threats are very complex, consequently, reacting to those needs complex, coordinated 
and harmonised strategy. Diplomatic, economic, military and other actions need to be 
coordinated, so that their interference would target strengthening. 
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Asymmetry can be of cost-effective or psychological nature, although they are 
interconnected. Materialistic asymmetry can quite often produce a psychological one. 
Sides who used manipulative techniques, who built their actions on psychological 
asymmetry, were successful. The most effective is the combination of the two, although 
psychological advantages need more of intellectual and less of financial investment. 
 
In history there are several examples of asymmetry of operational level. During WW2, 
for example, the submarine warfare of Germans was aimed at countering the superiority 
of the traditional colonial one of the British. 
In the case of political-strategically asymmetry, military advantages are reached not by 
military means. This strategy was successful in North Vietnam, where it was possible to 
portrait their moral superiority against the aggressor, the USA, while neither Milosevic, 
nor Saddam Hussein succeeded in doing so. 
 
3.3. FORMS OF ASYMMETRY 
 
Asymmetry can be recognised both in methods and procedures, which means different 
operational and strategic concept (guerrilla warfare vs. traditional operational concept, 
airborne, airborne mobile operations vs. traditional infantry warfare, etc.) 
 
Technological asymmetry was a regular phenomenon in the past (eg.  The Vietnam 
War, the Afghan talibs vs. The USA, etc.) 
Asymmetry is represented in the „willingness”, in the moral part of the warfare, as long 
as a state fights for its existence and its basic interests. In this case this aim can multiply 
military forces; on the other hand,   the combat willingness of an occupying party, 
whose aims are not of vital importance, can be weaker, due to its moral deficiency. 
Organisational asymmetry can also be of great importance in the final result of combat, 
since the organisational frames, warfare based on teamwork, preparation for decision- 
making significantly determines the best operational concept and success. 
 
4. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 
  
As we have shown in our short   summary above, there is a well-defined system 
of the notion of   asymmetric warfare in  special literature, which also deals with 
the analysis of the  psychological aspects of past warfare. 
 
If we want to analyse the topic, not to base it only on history, but also in the present 
and the possible future scenarios of security risk factors, it cannot be avoided to analyse 
the psychological aspects that are not of local character, which, in our case, describe 
those psychological aspects that are more serious than local problems and they can be 
of interest for the analysis of the phenomenon. 
 
4.1. FRAGMENTS OF THE MASS PSYCHOLOGY 
OF THE ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 
 
In case of the notion of asymmetric warfare when it represents the actions of opposing 
forces that are in confrontation, when the sphere of operation, their targets, arsenals 
used by one of the sides can significantly differ from those of the opponent – first of all, 
we need to emphasize that it is not a new phenomenon. 
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We have already pointed out, asymmetric warfare could have been recognised starting 
from the ancient times up to modern times, and the fact that it plays such a significant 
role either in military doctrine research or in publications in the press, has two basic 
reasons. 
As we see, one of the reasons is that something has ended, something that, relatively for 
a long time, even if not easily but still could handle certain basic security criteria. As 
a matter of fact, within the historic validity of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements – even 
though in the meanwhile several military conflicts were marked by the signs 
of asymmetric warfare- the existence of the bipolar world, the desire to establish 
balance in the world caused people to think that symmetric arms race is bad but there is 
nothing it can be substituted by in the upholding of the balance between the two world 
systems. This system ceased to exist and together with it the unspoken mutual 
agreement that both poles get a free hand to keep order in their spheres of interest, 
respectively. There was no fear of the gigantic opposition for the world any more, fears 
of the past disappeared. 
 
From the point of mass psychology, it could have been the time to feel relieved, but 
the past fears were immediately substitutes by new ones. It turned out that those 
prepared for symmetric warfare had no idea whatsoever how to handle asymmetric 
threats that rapidly became a world problem. Their system of institutions ( including 
military defence structures ), proved to be as useless in the fight against terrorism as  
well as  in the fight against other, global kinds of crime, for example, financial, IT, 
technological, biological, cultural, etc. Those brought up in the symmetric system, soon 
realised that their sense of  defencelessness became acute, nobody and nothing can 
protect them anymore, that  each bite of food, each drop of water, each flight, seaside 
resort or underground station can be dangerous, and these fears are absolutely irrational, 
since they are threatened regardless of their behaviour or nationality. 
 
The other reason for the seriousness of the mass psychological effects of the asymmetric 
warfare can be traced back to the so- called globality, which appeared as a result 
of a non- organic development. It means that the structure of globality in many regions 
is not the result of its own organic development, but often imports from developed 
regions built into given cultures non- organically. Even with only one look into 
the problem, it brings up a number of questions like the influence of films from Western 
countries or advertisements, in such remote regions that are far away 
from the possibilities of this kind of lifestyle. How can people who are destitute use 
these possibilities, those who never used a telephone, who had never been seen by 
a doctor, and they are as distant from the lifestyle of a Western billionaire as of that 
of a simple shop assistant? Or what about state or religion leaders who fight for peace, 
who are not able to accept social differences of this magnitude, not to mention those 
who base their carriers on demagogue anger raising and call for “sacred wars”?  
 
Globality can not only diminish, but can also strengthen prejudice, everyday racism, 
intentional provocation, aggression. Moreover, those used to symmetric behaviour; do 
not consider the fact that the developed civilisations are much more vulnerable than 
the less developed ones. With proper military superiority it is easy to paralyse several 
road junctions, central energy supply points or satellites. But what is the value 
of the military superiority when there is no electricity and the main means of transport 
are donkeys?  With this example we simply want to emphasize that in case 
of asymmetric warfare a certain degree of under development can be an advantage and 
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this advantage can be diminished not by applying the most modern means, but by new 
arms doctrines, moreover, by the establishment of  new mass psychology behavioural 
culture. 
 
„All significant American military failures since 1945 – Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia 
– were  in  the fight against a weaker opponent.  Either in the so- called hot or  cold 
wars  the USA was successful, let he enemy be the Nazi Germany, the empire  of Japan 
or the Soviet Union, however, the Americans did not always won against weaker 
opponents… In all cases an American Goliath got into stalemate situation and suffered 
political defeat from the local Davids. The fact that the weaker defeats the stronger, 
although it is exceptional happens again and again. Sparta eventually won against 
Athens. Frederick the Great always punched well above his waist. American rebels 
stopped the British domination in 13 colonies, Jewish terrorists ruled out the Brits from 
Palestine, the Vietnamese communists got rid of the French, then the Americans from 
Indochina and the mudjaheddins presented a „Vietnam„ to the Soviets in Afghanistan. 
The relative size of the military forces cannot predict effectively the outcome 
of the war.” 4
 
 
It is quite obvious that in an attack against antagonists it is not the most effective 
if army of massive strength, UAVs or heavy artillery is implied, but rather actions 
similar to those based on military and police structures, with their help it is possible to 
diminish the   asymmetry of the opposing sides. For the axiomatic practice of such 
doctrines it is necessary to change old patterns, complicated interest as well as to change 
the old ways of fighting against global crime. 
 
It is also necessary that those professional – political organisations responsible for 
the well- being of the mankind would consider their main aim as of the establishment 
of global security instead of dealing with their local interests.    Consequently, 
asymmetry as an existing reality should not be the tool aimed at the destruction 
of the „different” or „difference” but it should be a relative basis that could provide 
the condition of balance to enhance better global cooperation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In our paper we briefly summarised some correlations between the psychological 
aspects of asymmetric warfare and its threats. Asymmetric warfare, as it is 
demonstrated in this article, is a complex sociological problem, which, opposed too 
many simplifying opinions, is not equal with the terrorism. 
 
If we want to understand the important questions about asymmetric warfare and 
the consequent threats, it is essential to understand the question of the so- called „choice 
of target” method of the antagonist who bases its strategy on asymmetry. 
 
To simplify this: how, according to what principles, what are the expected effects 
when targets are chosen? From the point of view of symmetry, as a potential opponent 
of asymmetric antagonist, we should be able to define, for the benefit of defence, to 
define the list of objects and the possible forms of the attack. This task is of priority 
                                                 
4 Jeffrey Record : Why the Strong Lose, Parameters,  Winter, 2005-06, pp. 16-31., 
(http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/05winter/record.htm) 
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mainly for operational experts (reconnaissance staff) and they can perform this task 
successfully only in case if they are familiar with the psychological background 
of the asymmetric warfare. 
However, problems described by us point beyond their military aspects: the concepts 
of mass psychology are in tight correlation with the fact that the process of globalisation 
has only partially finished and simply from the nature of this process of development 
comes the proliferation of asymmetries that hinder normal functions. The first task 
in connection with this – understanding the reasons of their appearance – to accept their 
existence. The second task, although we are able to explain the proliferation of this 
phenomenon, is to urge for a global and worldwide action for the establishment 
of a possible symmetry. The third task is to clarify the fact that this work cannot be 
considered simply as a military one, but we need to aim to establish an opportunity 
for a more thorough globalisation than the existing one. 
 
With our article we want to get connected to the process of learning without hiding our 
aim to help our Hungarian soldiers who work in the operational field, as well as those 
civilians who participate in research to understand this undoubtedly significant 
phenomenon.    
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